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'
LEONEN, and
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Promulgated:

--------------------~~~:-~~~~~~-----------~~~:~~:~--~:-~-~~~--DECISION
LEONEN,J.:
Through this Petition for Certiorari, Lucena D. Demaala (Demaala)
prays that the September 22, 2008 Decision (Decision No. 2008-087) 1 and
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On leave.
On official leave.
Rollo, pp. 25-31.
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the November 16, 2011 Resolution (Decision No. 2011-083)2 of the
Commission on Audit be reversed and set aside.
The Commission on Audit’s Decision No. 2008-0873 denied
Demaala’s appeal and affirmed with modification Local Decision No. 20060564 dated April 19, 2006 of the Commission on Audit’s Legal and
Adjudication Office (LAO). LAO Local Decision No. 2006-056, in turn,
affirmed Notice of Charge (NC) No. 2004-04-101.5 NC No. 2004-04-101
was dated August 30, 2004 and issued by Rodolfo C. Sy (Regional Cluster
Director Sy), Regional Cluster Director of the Legal Adjudication Sector,
Commission on Audit Regional Office No. IV, Quezon City.
The Commission on Audit’s Decision No. 2011-083 denied the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by Demaala.6
I
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan enacted Provincial
Ordinance No. 332-A, Series of 1995, entitled “An Ordinance Approving
and Adopting the Code Governing the Revision of Assessments,
Classification and Valuation of Real Properties in the Province of Palawan”
(Ordinance).7 Chapter 5, Section 48 of the Ordinance provides for an
additional levy on real property tax for the special education fund at the rate
of one-half percent or 0.5% as follows:
Section 48- Additional Levy on Real Property Tax for Special
Education Fund. There is hereby levied an annual tax at the rate
of one-half percent (1/2%) of the assessed value property tax. The
proceeds thereof shall exclusively accrue to the Special Education
Fund (SEF).8

In conformity with Section 48 of the Ordinance, the Municipality of
Narra, Palawan, with Demaala as mayor, collected from owners of real
properties located within its territory an annual tax as special education fund
at the rate of 0.5% of the assessed value of the property subject to tax. This
collection was effected through the municipal treasurer.9
On post-audit, Audit Team Leader Juanito A. Nostratis issued Audit
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Id. at 19–24.
Id. at 25–31.
Id. at 48–51.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 19–24.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 72 and 199.
Id. at 214.
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Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 03-005 dated August 7, 2003 in
which he noted supposed deficiencies in the special education fund collected
by the Municipality of Narra.10 He questioned the levy of the special
education fund at the rate of only 0.5% rather than at 1%, the rate stated in
Section 23511 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991 (Local Government Code).12
After evaluating AOM No. 03-005, Regional Cluster Director Sy
issued NC No. 2004-04-101 dated August 30, 200413 in the amount of
1,125,416.56. He held Demaala, the municipal treasurer of Narra, and all
special education fund payors liable for the deficiency in special education
fund collections.
This Notice of Charge reads:
NC No. 2004-04-101
Date: August 30, 2004
NOTICE OF CHARGE
The Municipal Mayor
Narra, Palawan
Attention: Municipal Accountant
We have reviewed and evaluated Audit Obersvation Memorandum
(AOM) No. 03-005 dated August 7, 2003 and noted the following
deficiencies:
Reference
No. Date

PAYOR

AMOUNT
CHARGED
1,125,416.56

Please see
schedule

attached

1,125,416.56

Persons LIABLE
Lucena D. Demaala
- Municipal Mayor
- for allowing the
reduced rate of
additional real
property taxes
Municipal Treasurer
- for collecting
understated taxes
All payors

FACTS AND/OR
REASONS FOR
CHARGE
The additional levy for
SEF should be one per
cent (1%) instead of
0.5% as provided in
RA 5447 dated
September 25, 1968

Charge not appealed within six (6) months as prescribed under
Sections 49, 50 and 51 of PD No. 1445 shall become final and executory.
RODOLFY C. SY (sgd.)
10
11

12
13

Id. at 199.
Section 235. Additional Levy on Real Property for the Special Education Fund (SEF). - A province or
city, or a municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area, may levy and collect an annual tax of one
percent (1%) on the assessed value of real property which shall be in addition to the basic real property
tax. The proceeds thereof shall exclusively accrue to the Special Education Fund (SEF).
Rollo, pp. 199 and 214.
Id. at 32.
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Regional Cluster Director14

The Municipality of Narra, through Demaala, filed the Motion for
Reconsideration15 dated December 2, 2004. It stressed that the collection of
the special education fund at the rate of 0.5% was merely in accordance with
the Ordinance. On March 9, 2005, Regional Cluster Director Sy issued an
Indorsement denying this Motion for Reconsideration.16
Following this, the Municipality of Narra, through Demaala, filed an
appeal17 with the Commission on Audit’s Legal and Adjudication Office. In
Local Decision No. 2006-05618 dated April 19, 2006, this appeal was denied.
The Municipality of Narra, through Demaala, then filed a Petition for
Review19 with the Commission on Audit.
In Decision No. 2008-08720 dated September 22, 2008, the
Commission on Audit ruled against Demaala and affirmed LAO Local
Decision No. 2006-056 with the modification that former Palawan Vice
Governor Joel T. Reyes and the other members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan who enacted the Ordinance21 were held jointly and
severally liable with Demaala, the municipal treasurer of Narra, and the
special education fund payors.22
The dispositive portion of this Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, LAO Local Decision No. 2006056 is AFFIRMED with modification, to include Former Vice-Governor
and Presiding Officer Joel T. Reyes, Chairman Pro-Tempore Rosalino R.
Acosta, Majority Floor Leader Ernesto A. Llacuna, Asst. Majority Floor
Leader Antonio C. Alvarez, Asst. Minority Floor Leader Haide B.
Barroma, Hon. Leoncio N. Ola, Hon. Ramon A. Zabala, Hon. Belen B.
Abordo, Hon. Valentin A. Baaco, Hon. Claro Ordinario, Hon. Derrick R.
Pablico, Hon. Laine C. Abogado and Hon. Joel B. Bitongon among the
persons liable in the Notice of Charge. They shall be jointly and severally
liable with Mayor Lucena D. Demaala, together with the Municipal
Treasurer and all the payors of the under-collected real property tax in the
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22

Id.
Id. at 33–38. Denominated “Appeal” by the Municipality of Narra.
Id. at 5 and 49.
Id. at 41–45.
Id. at 48–51.
Id. at 52–61.
Id. at 25–30.
The other members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan are Rosalino R. Acosta, Ernesto A.
Llacuna, Antonio C. Alvarez, Haide B. Barroma, Leoncio N. Ola, Ramon A. Zabala, Belen B. Abordo,
Valentin A. Baaco, Claro Ordinario, Derrick R. Pablico, Lanie C. Abogado, and Joel B. Bitongon.
Rollo, p. 30.
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1,125,416.56.

The Audit Team Leader is directed to issue a Supplemental Notice
of Charge to include the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as
among the persons liable.23

Thereafter, Demaala, who was no longer the mayor of the
Municipality of Narra, filed a Motion for Reconsideration.24 Former Vice
Governor Joel T. Reyes and the other members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan who were held liable under Decision No. 2008-087
filed a separate Motion for Reconsideration.25 The Commission on Audit’s
Decision No. 2011-08326 dated November 16, 2011 affirmed its September
22, 2008 Decision.
Demaala then filed with this court the present Petition for Certiorari.27
Respondent Commission on Audit, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed its Comment28 on April 20, 2012. Petitioner Demaala filed
her Reply29 on September 6, 2012. Thereafter, the parties filed their
respective Memoranda.30
II
For resolution in this case are the following issues:
First, whether respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that there was a
deficiency in the Municipality of Narra’s collection of the additional levy for
the special education fund. Subsumed in this issue is the matter of whether a
municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area, a city, or a province may
have an additional levy on real property for the special education fund at the
rate of less than 1%.
Second, assuming that respondent correctly held that there was a
deficiency, whether respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess or jurisdiction in holding petitioner personally
liable for the deficiency.

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Id. at 30.
Id. at 64–67.
Id. at 68–80.
Id. at 19–24.
Id. at 3–16.
Id. at 134–147.
Id. at 185–187.
Id. at 197–209 and 213–223.
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We find for petitioner.
Setting the rate of the additional levy for the special education fund at
less than 1% is within the taxing power of local government units. It is
consistent with the guiding constitutional principle of local autonomy.
III
The power to tax is an attribute of sovereignty. It is inherent in the
state. Provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays are mere territorial
and political subdivisions of the state. They act only as part of the
sovereign. Thus, they do not have the inherent power to tax.31 Their power
to tax must be prescribed by law.
Consistent with the view that the power to tax does not inhere in local
government units, this court has held that a reserved temperament must be
adhered to in construing the extent of a local government unit’s power to tax.
As explained in Icard v. City Council of Baguio:32
It is settled that a municipal corporation unlike a sovereign state is
clothed with no inherent power of taxation. The charter or statute must
plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality, cannot
assume it. And the power when granted is to be construed in strictissimi
juris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the term used in granting that
power must be resolved against the municipality. Inferences, implications,
deductions – all these – have no place in the interpretation of the taxing
power of a municipal corporation.33 (Emphasis supplied)

Article X, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution is the basis of the taxing
power of local government units:
Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to
create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and
charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress
may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.
Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
governments. (Emphasis supplied)

31

32
33

Pelizloy Realty Corporation v. Province of Benguet, G.R. No. 183137, April 10, 2013, 695 SCRA 491,
500 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division], citing Reyes v. Almanzor, 273 Phil. 558, 564 (1991) [Per J. Paras,
En Banc]; Icard v. City Council of Baguio, 83 Phil 870, 873 (1949) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc]; City of
Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337 (1959) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, En Banc]; and CONST. (1987), art. X,
sec. 1.
83 Phil 870, 873 (1949) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
Id., citing Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone, 42 Phil. 818, 830 (1922) [Per J. Ostrand, En Banc]; Pacific
Commercial Co. v. Romualdez, 49 Phil. 917, 924 (1927) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc]; Batangas
Transportation Co. v. Provincial Treasure of Batangas, 52 Phil. 190,196 (1928) [Per J. Villamor, En
Banc]; Baldwin v. Coty Council 53 Ala., p. 437; State v. Smith 31 Lowa, p. 493; 38 Am Jur pp. 68, 72–
73.
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The taxing power granted by constitutional fiat to local government
units exists in the wider context to “ensure the autonomy of local
governments.”34 As Article II, Section 25 of the 1987 Constitution
unequivocally provides:
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments.

Article II, Section 25 is complemented by Article X, Section 2:
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy
local autonomy.

The 1935 Constitution was entirely silent on local autonomy, albeit
making a distinction between executive departments, bureaus, and offices on
the one hand, and local governments on the other. It provided that the
President had control over the former but merely “exercise[d] general
supervision”35 over the latter. Article VII, Section 10(1) of the 1935
Constitution provided:
SEC. 10. (1) The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over
all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care
that the laws be faithfully executed.

Similarly, the 1935 Constitution was silent on the taxing power of
local government units.
The 1973 Constitution provided for local autonomy. Article II, Section
10 of the 1973 Constitution read:
SEC. 10. The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of
local government units, especially the [barangays], to ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities.

Any trend in the 1973 Constitution towards greater autonomy for local
government units “was aborted in 1972 when Ferdinand Marcos placed the
entire country under martial law [thereby] stunt[ing] the development of
local governments by centralizing the government in Manila.”36 While local
autonomy was provided for in the 1973 Constitution, its existence was
confined to principle and theory. Practice neutered all of Article XI of the
1973 Constitution (on local government), including Section 5 which
34
35
36

CONST. (1987), art. II, sec. 25.
CONST. (1935), art. VII, sec. 10, par. (1).
DANTE B. GATMAYTAN, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, 3 (2014).
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provided for the taxing power of local government units. Article XI, Section
5 reads:
SEC. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create
its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.

Article X, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution is more emphatic in
empowering local government units in the matter of taxation compared with
Article XI, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution. In addition to stating that
local government units have the power to tax (subject to Congressional
guidelines and limitations), Article X, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution
adds the phrase “consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.”
Further, it is definite with the use of funds generated by local government
units through the exercise of their taxing powers, providing that “[s]uch
taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.”37
Apart from administrative autonomy, an equally vital facet of local
governance under the 1987 Constitution is fiscal autonomy. In Pimentel v.
Aguirre:38
Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having
administrative autonomy in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal
autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have
the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their
equitable share in the national taxes released by the national government,
as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their
own priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local
officials in turn have to work within the constraints thereof. They are not
formulated at the national level and imposed on local governments,
whether they are relevant to local needs and resources or not. Hence, the
necessity of a balancing of viewpoints and the harmonization of proposals
from both local and national officials, who in any case are partners in the
attainment of national goals.39

IV
The taxing powers of local government units must be read in relation
to their power to effect their basic autonomy.
Consistent with the 1987 Constitution’s declared preference, the
taxing powers of local government units must be resolved in favor of their

37
38
39

CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 5.
391 Phil. 84 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
Id. at 102–103, citing San Juan v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 92299, April 19, 1991, 196
SCRA 69, 79 [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].
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local fiscal autonomy. In City Government of San Pablo v. Reyes:40
The power to tax is primarily vested in Congress. However, in our
jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local legislative bodies, no longer
merely by virtue of a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to direct
authority conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution. Thus
Article X, Section 5 of the Constitution reads:
Sec. 5 — Each Local Government unit shall have
the power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy
taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and
limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with
the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and
charges shall accrue exclusively to the Local Governments.
The important legal effect of Section 5 is that henceforth, in
interpreting statutory provision on municipal fiscal powers, doubts will
have to be resolved in favor of municipal corporations.41 (Emphasis
supplied)

Similarly, in San Juan v. Civil Service Commission,42 this court stated:
We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a
law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized
power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy,
the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.43

The Local Government Code was enacted pursuant to the specific
mandate of Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution44 and its
requirements of decentralization. Its provisions, including those on local
taxation, must be read in light of the jurisprudentially settled preference for
local autonomy.
V
The limits on the level of additional levy for the special education
fund under Section 235 of the Local Government Code should be read as
granting fiscal flexibility to local government units.

40
41
42
43
44

364 Phil. 842 (1999) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division].
Id. at 856-857, citing ISAGANI A. CRUZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 84 (1991) and JOAQUIN G. BERNAS,
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, 381 (1st ed, 1988).
273 Phil. 271 (1991) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].
Id. at 279.
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications,
election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials,
and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
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Book II of the Local Government Code governs local taxation and
fiscal matters. Title II of Book II governs real property taxation.
Section 235 of the Local Government Code allows provinces and
cities, as well as municipalities in Metro Manila, to collect, on top of the
basic annual real property tax, an additional levy which shall exclusively
accrue to the special education fund:
Section 235. Additional Levy on Real Property for the Special
Education Fund. - A province or city, or a municipality within the
Metropolitan Manila Area, may levy and collect an annual tax of
one percent (1%) on the assessed value of real property which
shall be in addition to the basic real property tax. The proceeds
thereof shall exclusively accrue to the Special Education Fund
(SEF). (Emphasis supplied)

The special education fund is not an original creation of the Local
Government Code. It was initially devised by Republic Act No. 5447.45 The
rate of 1% is also not a detail that is original to the Local Government Code.
As discussed in Commission on Audit v. Province of Cebu:46
The Special Education Fund was created by virtue of R. A. No.
5447, which is [a]n act creating a special education fund to be constituted
from the proceeds of an additional real property tax and a certain portion
of the taxes on Virginia-type cigarettes and duties on imported leaf
tobacco, defining the activities to be financed, creating school boards for
the purpose, and appropriating funds therefrom, which took effect on
January 1, 1969. Pursuant thereto, P.D. No. 464, also known as the Real
Property Tax Code of the Philippines, imposed an annual tax of 1% on real
property which shall accrue to the SEF.47 (Citations omitted)

The operative phrase in Section 235’s grant to municipalities in Metro
Manila, cities, and provinces of the power to impose an additional levy for
the special education fund is prefixed with “may,” thus, “may levy and
collect an annual tax of one percent (1%).”
In Buklod nang Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E.M. Ramos
and Sons, Inc.48 the meaning of “may” was discussed as follows:
Where the provision reads “may,” this word shows that it is not
mandatory but discretionary. It is an auxiliary verb indicating
45

46
47
48

Rep. Act No. 5447 (1968), An Act Creating a Special Education Fund to be Constituted from the
Proceeds of an Additional Real Property Tax and a Certain Portion of the Taxes on Virginia-type
Cigarettes and Duties on Imported Leaf Tobacco, Defining the Activities to be Financed, Creating
School Boards for the Purpose, and Appropriating Funds Therefrom.
422 Phil. 519 (2001) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc].
Id. at 524-525.
G.R. No. 131481 and 131624, March 16, 2011, 645 SCRA 401 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First
Division].
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liberty, opportunity, permission and possibility. The use of the
word “may” in a statute denotes that it is directory in nature and
generally permissive only.49

Respondent concedes that Section 235’s grant to municipalities in
Metro Manila, to cities, and to provinces of the power to impose an
additional levy for the special education fund makes its collection optional.
It is not mandatory that the levy be imposed and collected. The controversy
which the Commission on Audit created is not whether these local
government units have discretion to collect but whether they have discretion
on the rate at which they are to collect.
It is respondent’s position that the option granted to a local
government unit is limited to the matter of whether it shall actually collect,
and that the rate at which it shall collect (should it choose to do so) is fixed
by Section 235. In contrast, it is petitioner’s contention that the option given
to a local government unit extends not only to the matter of whether to
collect but also to the rate at which collection is to be made.
We sustain the position of petitioner.
Section 235’s permissive language is unqualified. Moreover, there is
no limiting qualifier to the articulated rate of 1% which unequivocally
indicates that any and all special education fund collections must be at such
rate.
At most, there is a seeming ambiguity in Section 235. Consistent with
what has earlier been discussed however, any such ambiguity must be read
in favor of local fiscal autonomy. As in San Juan v. Civil Service
Commission,50 the scales must weigh in favor of the local government unit.
Fiscal autonomy entails “the power to create . . . own sources of
revenue.”51 In turn, this power necessarily entails enabling local government
units with the capacity to create revenue sources in accordance with the
realities and contingencies present in their specific contexts. The power to
create must mean the local government units’ power to create what is most
appropriate and optimal for them; otherwise, they would be mere
automatons that are turned on and off to perform prearranged operations.
Devolving power but denying its necessary incidents and accessories
is tantamount to not devolving power at all. A local government unit with a
49
50
51

Id. at 437, citing Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97753, August 10, 1992, 212
SCRA 448, 463 [Per J. Regalado, Second Division].
273 Phil. 271 (1991) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].
Pimentel v. Aguirre, 391 Phil. 84, 102–103 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
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more affluent constituency may thus realize that it can levy taxes at rates
greater than those which local government units with more austere
constituencies can collect. For the latter, collecting taxes at prohibitive rates
may be counterproductive. High tax rates can be a disincentive for doing
business, rendering it unattractive to commerce and thereby stunting, rather
than facilitating, their development. In this sense, insisting on uniformity
would be a disservice to certain local government units and would ultimately
undermine the aims of local autonomy and decentralization.
VI
Of course, fiscal autonomy entails “working within the constraints.”52
To echo the language of Article X, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, this is
to say that the taxing power of local government units is “subject to such
guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide.”53 It is the 1% as a
constraint on which the respondent Commission on Audit is insisting.
There are, in this case, three (3) considerations that illumine our task
of interpretation: (1) the text of Section 235, which, to reiterate, is cast in
permissive language; (2) the seminal purpose of fiscal autonomy; and (3) the
jurisprudentially established preference for weighing the scales in favor of
autonomy of local government units. We find it to be in keeping with
harmonizing these considerations to conclude that Section 235’s specified
rate of 1% is a maximum rate rather than an immutable edict. Accordingly,
it was well within the power of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan to
enact an ordinance providing for additional levy on real property tax for the
special education fund at the rate of 0.5% rather than at 1%.
VII
It was an error amounting to grave abuse of discretion for respondent
to hold petitioner personally liable for the supposed deficiency.
Having established the propriety of imposing an additional levy for
the special education fund at the rate of 0.5%, it follows that there was
nothing erroneous in the Municipality of Narra’s having acted pursuant to
Section 48 of the Ordinance. It could thus not be faulted for collecting from
owners of real properties located within its territory an annual tax as special
education fund at the rate of 0.5% of the assessed value subject to tax of the
property. Likewise, it follows that it was an error for respondent to hold
petitioner personally liable for the supposed deficiency in collections.

52
53

Id.
CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 5.
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Even if a contrary ruling were to be had on the propriety of collecting
at a rate less than 1%, it would still not follow that petitioner is personally
liable for deficiencies.
In its Memorandum, respondent cited the 1996 case of Salalima v.
Guingona54 as a precedent for finding local officials liable for violations that
have to do with the special education fund.
Moreover, in Decision No. 2008-087, respondent asserted that there
was “no cogent reason to exclude [petitioner] from liability since her
participation as one of the local officials who implemented the collection of
the reduced levy rate. . . led to the loss on reduction [sic] of government
income.”55 It added that, “[c]orollary thereto, the government can also go
against the officials who are responsible for the passage of [the
Ordinance],”56 i.e., the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Province of Palawan.
Respondent’s reliance on Salalima and on petitioner’s having been
incidentally the mayor of Narra, Palawan when supposedly deficient
collections were undertaken is misguided.
Per respondent’s own summation of Salalima, in that case, this court:
held that the governor, vice-governor and members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan are collectively responsible with other
provincial officials in the administration of fiscal and financial
transactions of the province pursuant to Sections 304 and 305 of
RA 7160 for denying the other beneficiaries of their share of the
SEF. These local officials cannot claim ignorance of the law as to
the sharing scheme of the real property tax and the SEF as the
same is clearly provided in RA 7160.57 (Emphasis supplied)

Salalima involved several administrative Complaints filed before the
Office of the President against the elective officials of the Province of Albay.
One of these — OP Case No. 5470 — was a Complaint for malversation,
and “consistent [and] habitual violation of pars. (c) and (d) of Section 60 of
[the Local Government Code]”58 which was filed by Tiwi, Albay Mayor
Naomi Corral against Albay Governor Romeo Salalima, Vice-Governor
54
55
56
57
58

326 Phil. 847 (1996) [Per J. Davide, En Banc].
Rollo, p. 29.
Id.
Id. at 222-A.
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. - An elective local official may be disciplined,
suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds:

....
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision
mayor[.]
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Danilo Azaña, and other Sangguniang Panlalawigan members.
This Complaint was precipitated by the refusal of the provincial
officials of Albay to make available to the Municipality of Tiwi, Albay its
share in the collections of the special education fund. This was contrary to
Section 272 of the Local Government Code59 which requires equal sharing
between provincial and municipal school boards. Specifically, it was found
that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed Ordinance No. 09-92, which
declared as forfeited in favor of the Province of Albay (and to the exclusion
of the municipalities in Albay) all payments made by the National Power
Corporation to the former pursuant to a memorandum of agreement through
which the National Power Corporation settled its real property tax
obligations.
As regards the personal liability of the respondents in that case, the
Office of the President was quoted to have anchored on the following
disquisition its imposition of the penalty of suspension on the respondent
provincial officials:
It cannot be denied that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has control
over the Province’s ‘purse’ as it may approve or not resolutions or
ordinances generating revenue or imposing taxes as well as appropriating
and authorizing the disbursement of funds to meet operational
requirements or for the prosecution of projects.
Being entrusted with such responsibility, the provincial governor,
vice-governor and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, must
always be guided by the so-called ‘fundamental’ principles enunciated
under the Local Government Code[.] . . .
All the respondents could not claim ignorance of the law especially
with respect to the provisions of P.D. No. 464 that lay down the sharing
scheme among local government units concerned and the national
government, for both the basic real property tax and additional tax
pertaining to the Special Education Fund. Nor can they claim that the
Province could validly forfeit the P40,724,471.74 paid by NPC
considering that the Province is only entitled to a portion thereof and that
the balance was merely being held in trust for the other beneficiaries.
As a public officer, respondent Azaña (and the other respondents as
well) has a duty to protect the interests not only of the Province but also of
the municipalities of Tiwi and Daraga and even the national government.
When the passage of an illegal or unlawful ordinance by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan is imminent, the presiding officer has a duty to act
59

Section 272. Application of Proceeds of the Additional One Percent SEF Tax. - The proceeds from the
additional one percent (1%) tax on real property accruing to the Special Education Fund (SEF) shall be
automatically released to the local school boards: Provided, That, in case of provinces, the proceeds
shall be divided equally between the provincial and municipal school boards: Provided, however, That
the proceeds shall be allocated for the operation and maintenance of public schools, construction and
repair of school buildings, facilities and equipment, educational research, purchase of books and
periodicals, and sports development as determined and approved by the Local School Board.
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accordingly, but actively opposing the same by temporarily relinquishing
his chair and participating in the deliberations. If his colleagues insist on
its passage, he should make known his opposition thereto by placing the
same on record. No evidence of any sort was shown in this regard by
respondent Azaña.
Clearly, all the respondents have, whether by act or omission,
denied the other beneficiaries of their rightful shares in the tax
delinquency payments made by the NPC and caused the illegal forfeiture,
appropriation and disbursement of funds not belonging to the Province,
through the passage and approval of Ordinance No. 09-92 and Resolution
Nos. 178-92 and 204-92.
The foregoing factual setting shows a wanton disregard of law on
the part of the respondents tantamount to abuse of authority. Moreover,
the illegal disbursements made can qualify as technical malversation.60

It is evident that the circumstances in Salalima are not analogous to
the circumstances pertinent to petitioner.
While Salalima involved the mishandling of proceeds which was
“tantamount to abuse of authority” and which “can qualify as technical
malversation,” this case involves the collection of the additional levy for the
special education fund at a rate which, at the time of the collection, was
pursuant to an ordinance that was yet to be invalidated.
Likewise, Salalima involved the liability of the provincial officials
who were themselves the authors of an invalid ordinance. In this case, the
Municipality of Narra — as subordinate to the Province of Palawan —
merely enforced a provincial ordinance.
Respondent, in its own
Memorandum, acknowledged that it was not even petitioner but the
municipal treasurer who actually effected the collection at a supposedly
erroneous rate.61
Also, Salalima entailed the imposition of the administrative penalty of
suspension. In this case, respondent is not concerned with the imposition of
administrative penalties but insists that petitioner must herself (jointly and
severally with the other persons named) pay for the deficiency in collections.
We find it improper to hold petitioner personally liable for the
uncollected amount on account of the sheer happenstance that she was the
mayor of Narra, Palawan, when the Ordinance was enforced.
VIII
60
61

Salalima v. Guingona, 326 Phil. 847, 874-875 (1996) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].
Rollo, p. 214.
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The actions of the officials of the Municipality of Narra are consistent
with the rule that ordinances are presumed valid. In finding liability,
respondent suggests that officers of the Municipality should not comply with
an ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
It is true that petitioner, as the local chief executive, was charged with
fidelity to our laws. However, it would be grossly unfair to sustain
respondent's position. It implacably dwells on supposed non-compliance
with Section 235 but turns a blind eye on the context which precipitated the
collection made by the Municipality ofNarra at the reduced rate of 0.5%.
The mayor's actions were done pursuant to an ordinance which, at the
time of the collection, was yet to be invalidated.
It is basic that laws and local ordinances are "presumed to be valid

unless and until the courts declare the contrary in clear and unequivocal
terms." 62 Thus, the concerned officials of the Municipality of Narra,
Palawan must be deemed to have conducted themselves in good faith and
with regularity when they acted pursuant to Chapter 5, Section 48 of
Provincial Ordinance No. 332-A, Series of 1995~ and collected the additional
levy for the special education fund at the rate of 0.5o/o. Accordingly, it was
impr9per for respondent to attribute personal liability to petitioner and to
require her to personally answer to the deficiency in special education fund
collections.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED .. Decision No. 2008-087
dated September 22, 2008 and Decision No. 2011-083 dated November 16,
2011 of respondent Commission on Audit are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
'\

WE CONCUR:

62

Valley Trading Co., Inc. v. C'FI of /sabe!a. 253 Phil. 494 (1989) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division].
See also Social Justice Society v. Atienza, 568 Phil. 658, 682-683 (2008) [Per J. Corona, First
Division].
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